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NOLO CONTENDERE IN NORTH CAROLINA
EDWARD LANE-RETICKER*

In his opinion in Fox v. Scheidt,' Mr. justice Parker noted that the
plea of nolo contendere 2 passed out of use in England early in the
Eighteenth Century, but that "recent years have brought about a renaissance of the plea of nolo contendere in the United States, especially in
the Federal Courts where, it is said, thousands of defendants have entered
the plea to indictments and criminal informations charging them with
violating the anti-trust and income tax laws, because of the attractiveness
of certain of its features for the defendant."
The recent renaissance of the plea is by no means confined to the
federal courts. Of twenty-one cases involving the plea which have
reached the Supreme Court of North Carolina, fifteen have been decided in the last ten years, and ten of these have been decided in the last
five years. If the frequency with which. an issue is raised on appeal is a
fair index of the frequency with which it is injected into litigation, it
may be assumed that the use of the plea of nolo contendere is many
times more common today than it was twenty, or even ten, years ago.
In view of the increase in the use of the plea of nolo contendere, the
development of the plea in North Carolina should be of interest.8 For
the purposes of discussion, a division will be made between cases which
discuss the incidents of the plea in the case in which it is entered and
cases which consider the effect of the plea in other proceedings.
THE INCIDENTS OF THE PLEA IN THE CASE IN WHICH IT IS ENTERED

In State v. Oxendine,4 the first instance found in which a case involving nolo contendere reached the Supreme Court, a free Negro submitted 5 to an indictment for assault and battery. A statute, required
that, in the case of a free Negro or free person of color who had been
convicted of a criminal offense and who was unable to pay the fine imposed, the court direct the sheriff to hire the defendant out for the payment of the fine. From the judgment ordering him hired out under this
*Assistant Director, Institute of Government, University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
1241 N. C. 31, 84 S. E. 2d 259 (1954).
2 "I do not wish to contend." Non vult [contendere] is the same plea expressed
in the third person singular.
'For a general discussion of the plea, see Note, 30 N. C. L. REv. 407 (1952)
and authorities there cited.

'19 N. C. 435 (1837).

The court regarded submission as the equivalent of a plea of nolo contendere.
'N. C. Laws, 1831, c. 13.
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statute, the defendant appealed on constitutional grounds. The Court
avoided a discussion of the constitutional issues and reversed the judgment of the trial court on the ground that the defendant, having pleaded
nolo contendere, had not been convicted, and that the statute, by its
terms, applied only to convicted defendants.7
In the light of later decisions, three aspects of the Oxendine case
should be especially noted: (1) the holding that there was no conviction,
(2) the fact that the judgment successfully attacked was entered in the
same criminal case as the plea of nolo contendere, and (3) the fact that
the hiring-out was mandatory under the statute. 8 As to the first aspect,
the holding that there was no conviction could be accepted, if at all, only
with major reservations and qualifications. The second and third
aspects, or either of them, would probably dictate a contrary result in
North Carolina today.
Other decisions have made it clear that a plea of nolo contendere is
equivalent to a plea of guilty for the purposes of punishment 9 and that,
as in the case of a plea of guilty, it is not necessary for the court to determine guilt or innocence before sentencing.' 0 Like a plea of guilty, a
plea of nolo contendere waives irregularities in a warrant for a misdemeanor."
At one time a statute authorized the use of nolo contendere as a
conditional plea. 12 Upon acceptance of the plea, the judge was to hear
the evidence. If satisfied that the defendant was not guilty, he was to
strike the plea of nolo contendere and to enter a verdict of not guilty.
to the constitutional guarantee of trial
This statute was held repugnant
14
by jury' 3 in State v. Camby.
The fact that a hearing has been held and evidence introduced after
submission of the plea has sometimes been the basis of a defendant's
contention that he has not been properly tried. In State v. Beasley,15 the
defendant pleaded nolo contendere to a gambling offense. Upon request
the solicitor introduced evidence to acquaint the court with the nature
of the offense, and to enable the court to fix the sentence. The de7The court did not avoid the constitutional problem for long. See State v.
Manuel, 20 N. C. 144 (1838).
the defendant's in-

1 Mandatory in the sense that the court, having determined
the sheriff to hire him out.
ability to pay the fine, was required to direct
See State v. Stans0 Stat v. Parker, 220 N. C. 416, 17 S. E. 2d 475 (1941).
bury, 230 N. C. 605, 55 S. E. 2d 79 (1949).
10 State v. Ayers, 226 N. C. 579, 39 S. E. 2d 607 (1946).
11
State v. Tripp, 236 N. C. 320, 72 S. E. 2d 660 (1952). A plea of nolo contendere formerly served as waiver of a bill of indictment. Public Laws, 1907, c.

71; formerly codified as N. C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 15-140; now rewritten to provide

for express waiver by Session Laws, 1951, c. 726.
" N. C. Public Laws, 1933, c. 23.
"s NORTH CAROLINA CoxsTiTuTIoN, art. V, sec. 13.
14209 N. C. 50, 182 S. E. 699 (1395).
'r 226 N. C. 580, 39 S. E. 2d 607 (1946).
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fendant's appeal was based on the ground that the evidence so introduced failed to prove a crime. In a per curiam decision, the Court held
that the defendant's appeal was groundless since the guilt of the accused
was not at issue.
The nature and purpose of the hearing held in State v. Shepherd10
was not so clear. The record-stated that the defendant through counsel
"enters a plea of nolo contendere [to forgery and uttering, and embezzlement] and permits the court to hear the evidence and find the facts."
A hearing before the court at which both sides offered evidence followed. At its conclusion, the court announced that the defendant was
guilty of at least two of the charges on his own testimony. Nothing more
appearing, this procedure would seem to be precisely that condemned as
unconstitutional by the Camby case. However, the trial court also stated
that it had "rendered no verdict" and was pronouncing judgment on
"the defendant's plea of nolo contendere." Chief Justice Stacy conceded that there was doubt as to the "intent, scope, and purpose" of the
hearing before the trial court and that the record seemed contradictory;
but he affirmed the judgment below, pointing out that the defendant
had made no attempt to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere. "Thus,
the case pivots on an interpretation of the record with something to be
said on both sides and the defendant required to show error against a
7
presumption of regularity." The fact situation in State v. Jarieson,1
is almost identical to that in the Shepherd case and its per curiam decision is to the same effect.
In State v. Home,'8 the defendant, who pleaded nolo contendere to
a charge of larceny, was successful in persuading the Supreme Court
to reverse a road sentence. Unlike the defendants in the Shepherd and
Janieson.cases, he was not represented by counsel. The defendant first
told the solicitor he would plead not guilty, and later that "he would
enter a plea of nolo contendere and let the judge hear the evidence and
render such judgment as the facts might warrant." After hearing some
of the evidence, the court observed that it was more a case of embezzlement than of larceny. The court said it would permit the defendant, if
he wished, to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere to the larceny indictment and direct the solicitor to obtain a bill for embezzlement. The
defendant elected to stand on his plea of nolo contendere, perhaps misled
by the court's observation into believing that he would be acquitted of
that charge. The records states that the court "after hearing the evidence adjudged the defendant guilty and sentenced him to serve a term
10 230 N. C. 605, 55 S. E. 2d 79 (1949).
17232
18234

N. C. 731, 62 S. E. 2d 52 (1950).
N. C. 115, 66 S. E. 2d 665 (1951).
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9

o. four months" on the roads.'
Since the defendant was apparently
confused as to the effect of his plea and the meaning of the court's remarks, was offered only a conditional opportunity to withdraw his plea,
and was without counsel, 20 reversal of the judgment was dictated by considerations of fair play.
The hearing in State v. Cooper,2 ' a prosecution for asault with a
deadly weapon with intent to kill and resulting in serious injury, was
held to be for the purpose of fixing sentence. The defendant's contentions that the State's evidence failed to prove his guilt, or, at most,
proved him guilty of assault without intent to kill, was rejected. Admission of evidence that defendant had previously discharged a firearm in a public eating place was held to have been proper in the presentencing hearing, although such evidence, the Court concedes, would
not have been admissible in a trial on the merits.
In State v. McIntyre,22 the record showed that the defendant entered
a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of reckless driving and speeding,
and that "upon hearing the evidence the court adjudged the defendant
guilty" and imposed sentence. The defendant was not represented by
counsel. Despite the apparent similarity to the Home case, the Court
affirmed the judgment. Although the defendant in this case was not
represented by counsel, the record does not suggest that he was misled
or confused as to the nature of his plea. In fact, there is a specific
finding of the trial court to the contrary. ' The hearing in this case
is characterized as a hearing to determine whether the plea of nolo
contendere should be accepted, 23 rather than as a hearing prior to
sentencing.
A very recent case is State v. Barbour.24 The defendant had pleaded
nolo contendere to two counts of assault, one of simple assault and one
of assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court found a verdict of
guilty on the first count but not guilty on the second. Raising the ques" Cf. State v. Shepherd, 230 N. C. 605, 55 S. E. 2d 79 (1949), in which the
record stated that judgment was imposed on the plea of nolo contendere.
'0 For admirers of judicial wit in general and Chief Justice Stacy's in particular,
his comment on this point is reproduced verbatim: "The defendant was inops
consliji during the trial. True, it was made to appear to the court that 'the defendant had studied law and had applied to take the examination to be permitted
to practice in North Carolina.' Nevertheless, he was undertaking to appear for
himself which affords some measure of his prudence and sagacity." State v. Home,
234 N. C. 115, 116, 66 S. E. 2d 665, 666 (1951).
21238 N. C. 241, 77 S. E. 2d 695 (1953).
2 238 N. C. 305, 77 S. E. 2d 698 (1953).
2" As this case makes clear, the plea of nolo contendere is not a matter of right.
Its acceptance is always within the discretion of the court. For this reason it has
sometimes been said that the nolo contendere is not a plea in the strict sense of the
term. 14 Amd. Jum., Criminal Law § 275 (1938).
2-243 N. C. 265, 90 S. E. 2d 388 (1955).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. ;34

tion of its own motion, 25 the Supreme Court saw in this procedure clear
indication that the trial court had tried issues of fact without a jury and
reversed the conviction.
State v. Barley2 6 was a prosecution of a taxi driver for a prohibition
violation. The defendant's attorney entered a plea of nolo contendere
over the defendant's objection. After hearing the testimony of the arresting officer, the court sentenced the defendant to three months
in jail and placed him on probation for twelve months. The defendant
then took the stand and said that he had not authorized the plea
and that he had contended from the beginning that he was not
guilty. (The attorney withdrew as counsel for the defendant.) The
court thereupon sentenced him to twelve months on the road, apparently
superseding its previous sentence. The Supreme Court held that the
defendant was entitled to a jury trial on the issue of his guilt and was
not bound by the plea which his attorney entered over his objection.
A consideration of the cases above justifies certain generalizations.
In the case in which it is entered, a plea of nolo contendere is equivalent
to a plea of guilty for purposes of the punishment that may be adjudged,
waiver of procedural irregularities, and dispensing with the necessity
of proving the guilt of the accused. It is not a conditional plea and may
not be used as a device to permit the trial court to determine issues of
fact without a jury. However, despite the decision in the Camby case
and frequent reaffirmation of its rule by the Supreme Court, there is
still some tendency on theopart of bench and bar to regard the plea as
conditional. While the Supreme Court has tolerated a certain amount
of ambiguity in the record as to the nature of the hearings held upon a
plea of nolo contendere, it has reversed convictions when it has appeared affirmatively that the defendant was misled or that the court tried
the case.
Considerable difficulty might be avoided if trial courts would undertake to make sure that defendants who offer pleas of nolo contendere
understand that they are submitting to punishment to the same extent
as if they had pleaded guilty. It should also be made clear that any
hearing held after a plea of nolo contendere has been submitted is for
the purpose of aiding the court in determining whether to accept the
plea, or, if the plea has been accepted, for the purpose of aiding the
court in fixing an appropriate sentence. The record should show that
judgment was given on the plea of nolo contendere and not upon a
verdict found after hearing the facts. If upon the hearing held to fix
sentence or determine whether the plea should be accepted, the court
"The defendant's only assignment of error was that the sentence imposed exceeded the statutory maximum.
20240 N. C. 253, 81 S. E. 2d 772 (1954).
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should become doubtful of the defendant's guilt and decide that the plea
of nolo contendere is improvident, the defendant should be allowed to
withdraw his plea and enter a plea of not guilty. The court should not
make a finding of not guilty while the plea of nolo contendere stands.
Two more cases remain for consideration before turning to a discussion of the effect of a plea of nolo contendere in a proceeding other
than the one in which the plea is entered. Both involve motions in the
cause made subsequent to the original disposition of the case. In State
v. Burnett,27 defendant had been indicted for operating a bawdy house
and had pleaded nolo contendere. Prayer for judgment was continued
on payment of costs. At a later term of court, the solicitor renewed his
motion for judgment. Upon evidence of continued operation of the
bawdy house, the defendant was sentenced to a twelve-month jail sentence. The contention on appeal was that acceptance of the plea of nolo
contendere precluded any sentence beyond that imposed when the plea
was accepted. The Court rejected this contention and held that the plea
of nolo contendere is equivalent to a plea of guilty for this purpose and
that pronouncement of judgment upon the renewed motion was proper.
State v. McKay28 was a seduction case. The defendant had pleaded
nolo contendere. Prayer for judgment had been continued on his agreement to a consent-compromise judgment requiring him to make installment payments to the prosecutrix. Over a year after the judgment was
entered the defendant married the prosecutrix and subsequently made
a motion in the cause to have the judgment set aside, relying on the
provision of C. S. 433920 to the effect that marriage is a bar to further
prosecution. The trial court refused to grant the motion and the
Supreme Court affirmed. The Court said the "statute clearly indicates
that the marriage must be before the party is adjudged guilty for defendant to get the benefit of the statute." [Emphasis supplied.] The
point in the case important to the development of the plea of nolo
contendere is that the Court clearly regarded the plea as the equivalent of
conviction for the purpose of the statute.
THE EFFECT OF THE PLEA IN OTHER PROCEEDINGS
The first North Carolina case directly to raise the issue of the effect
of a plea of nolo contendere in a proceeding other than the one in
27174 N. C. 796, 93 S. E. 473 (1917).

28202 N. C. 470, 163 S. E. 586 (1932).
. 0Now codified as N. C.GEN. STAT. § 14-180 (1953) : "If any man shall seduce
an innocent and virtuous woman under promise of marriage, he shall be guilty of a
felony, and upon conviction shall be fined or imprisoned at the discretion of the
court, and be imprisoned in the State prison not exceeding the term of five years:
• . . Provided further, that marriage between the parties shall be a bar to further
prosecution hereunder. ..."
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which it is entered was In re Stiers,30 a disbarment proceeding under
a statutory provision now repealed. 31 The attorney involved .had
pleaded nolo contendere in a federal district court to ten counts of embezzlement, had been fined, placed on probation, and suspended from
practice in that court. Thereupon, the superior court solicitor, following the mandate of the statute, presented in superior court a certified
copy of indictment, judgment, and docket entries from the federal court.
After argument, the court rendered the following judgment, "Upon the
foregoing record, the court is of the opinion that the plea of nolo contendere does not amount to a confession of a felony and therefore dismisses this proceeding." judgment was affirmed on two grounds,
(1) that the State had no right of appeal under the statute, and (2) that
the plea of nolo contendere did not amount to a "conviction or confession in open court." The trial court in its judgment had said only
that the plea did not amount to a confession. The Supreme Court added
that it did not amount to a conviction.
The next case in this line is State v. Thomas.32 The defendant
pleaded guilty to prohibition violations in Edgecombe County Recorder's
Court. He was given a two-year suspended sentence and placed on
probation for five years. One of the conditions of his probation was
that he "violate no penal law of any State or of the Federal Government and be of general good behavior." A few months later he entered
a plea of nolo contendere in another court to a charge of operating a
motor vehicle while his driver's license was suspended. The probation
officer reported this occurrence to the Edgecombe court and petitioned
for suitable disposition of the case. The Edgecombe court found that
the plea of nolo contendere to the offense of driving while license was
suspended constituted a violation of the conditions of the defendant's
probation and ordered the suspended sentence into effect. The superior
30204 N. C. 48, 167 S. E. 382 (1933).
1 Public Laws, 1929, c. 64; repealed by Public Laws, 1933, c. 210, s. 20. It provided: "No attorney-at-law shall be disbarred for crime unless after conviction or
confession in open court, State or Federal, of a criminal offense showing him to be
unfit to be trusted in the duties of his profession. After conviction of a felony
showing him to be unfit to be trusted in the duties of his profession he must be
disbarred by the court; and if any attorney be convicted of, or confesses to the
commission of a felony of such nature in a State court, the presiding judge of such
court (or if any attorney be convicted in a Federal court, it shall be the duty of
the solicitor of the district in which such attorney is practicing to secure a certified
copy of the judgment entered and present the same to the judge holding the courts
in said district), shall cause a judgment to be entered and docketed in the office
of the Clerk of the Superior Court in which such attorney is convicted, or in which
such attorney is practicing, disbarring said attorney, and the Clerk of the Superior
Court in which the same is docketed shall forthwith transmit a certified copy of
said judgment to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, whereupon the Supreme Court
shall revoke the license and the right of such attorney to practice law in the
State."
'2236 N. C. 196, 72 S. E. 2d 525 (1952).
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court affirmed the judgment but the Supreme Court reversed, saying
that it "seemed reasonable and logical that such plea ought not to be
used against the defendant as an admission in any other criminal action."
Therefore, it held that the plea of nolo contendere to the charge of
operating a motor vehicle while under suspension could not be used
against the defendant as an admission on the question of whether or not
he had violated the condition of his suspended sentence. "Proof of
such violation, if any, must be made independently of such plea, or of
'38
evidence or admission by defendant that such plea was made."
The three remaining cases of this type all involve driver's licenses
and were all decided in 1954. The first in Winesett v. Scheidt.84 The
petitioner had pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of drunken driving.
Instead of proceeding to revoke his license under G. S. § 20-17 (2),3 5
the Department of Motor Vehicles attempted to suspend it under G. S.
§ 20-16(a) 1, which in pertinent part reads:
"The Department shall have authority to suspend the license of
any operator ... upon a showing by ...satisfactory evidence that
the licensee . . .has committed an offense for which mandatory
revocation of license is required upon conviction."
Upon notification of the suspension, the petitioner requested a hearing
as provided by G. S. § 20-16(c). The only evidence before the hearing
officer at the hearing was the record that the petitioner had pleaded
nolo contendere to the drunken driving charge. The hearing officer overruled petitioner's objection to the use of this evidence and concluded that it was sufficient to establish commission of the offense. This
position was maintained by the Department on the appeal to superior
court, which ruled that its action in suspending the license was without
authority of law and that the petitioner was entitled to its return.
The Supreme Court upheld the superior court, holding that the plea
was not competent evidence as an admission of guilt, nor sufficient evidence to sustain the license suspension. It should be noted that the
issues had been framed at the hearing to make it clear that the Department was acting under a statutory provision that required it to show
commission of the offense, rather than conviction, and that the Depart" Conceding that the plea should not be admissible as an admission that the
defendant drove while under suspension, quaere: whether it ought not to have been
admissible as some evidence that the defendant had not been of "general good
behavior." Or suppose that the condition of the suspended sentence had included
a stipulation that the defendant not plead nolo contendere to any criminal charge?

3"239 N. C. 190, 79 S. E. 2d 501 (1954).
" "The Department shall forthwith revoke the license of any operator or
chauffeur upon receiving a record of such operator's or chauffeur's conviction for
. . . Driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a
narcotic drug." N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-17(2) (1953).

[Vol. 34
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ment's only proof of the commission of the offense was the plea of
6
nolo contendere.3
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Parker agreed that the plea
could not be used as attempted by the Department of Motor Vehicles,
but said that the Department had a duty to revoke the petitioner's license
under G. S. § 20-17.37 He reasoned that such action would be part of
the same case in which the plea had been entered and not a different
proceeding:
"Mandatory revocation is part of the punishment for driving
an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
When the court in Pasquotank County accepted the defendant's
plea of nolo contendere, G. S. 20-24, subsection (a),38 required
it to take up the license of the petitioner and forward the same
together with a record of the plea to the Department. Upon receipt of such license and record by the Department, G. S. 20-17
requires a mandatory revocation of the defendant's license.8 0
Such mandatory revocation by the Department seems to me as
much the performance of a ministerial duty in the petitioner's
case in Pasquotank County, as the Clerk of the Court in Pasquotank County entering the judgment of the court in the case in
the Minutes of that Court. I think it is the same case, the same
proceeding, the same forum." 40
In Fox v. Scheidt,41 Mr. Justice Parker, applying the reasoning of
his concurring opinion in the Winesett case, delivered the opinion of the
court. The petitioner had been convicted of drunken driving in 1949,
and his license had been revoked for one year. 42 In 1952, after an operator's license had been reissued to him, he pleaded nolo contendere to
a charge of a second offense of drunken driving. The Department of
Motor Vehicles, upon receiving a record of the entry and acceptance
" Cf. State v. Thomas, 236 N. C. 196, 72 S. E. 2d 525 (1952).

The Thomas

and Winesett cases are basically the same. In the former, a plea of nolo contendere was held inadmissible to prove a violation of law and hence of the
condition of the suspended sentence; in the latter the plea was held inadmissible
to prove the commission of an offense.

3 See note 35 supra.
". . . Whenever any person is convicted of any offense for which this article

makes mandatory the revocation of the operator's or chauffeur's license of such

person by the Department, the court in which such conviction is had shall require

the surrender to it of all operators' and chauffeurs' licenses then held by the per-

son so convicted and the court shall thereupon forward the same, together with a
record of such conviction, to the Department." N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-24 (a)
(1953).
"See note 35 supra.
"0Winesett v. Scheidt, 239 N. C. 190, 197, 79 S. E. 2d 501, 506 (1954).
"1241 N. C. 31, 84 S. E. 2d 259 (1954).
"2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-19 (c) (1953).
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of the plea, revoked his license for three years. 43 In 1954, apparently
encouraged by the outcome of the Winesett case, the petitioner sought
the issuance of an operator's license. The Department refused, basing
its refusal on the ground that his license was in a state of revocation
bceause of his plea of nolo contendere in the 1952 drunken driving case.
Upon petition in superior court, the Department was ordered to return
the license to the petitioner. Upon appeal by the Department, the
Supreme Court reversed the court below. While the decision follows
the reasoning of the concurring opinion in the Winesett case, it goes
somewhat further in that it introduces the element of legislative intent:
"The legislative intent and purpose is clear that in every case
of a conviction-and a plea of nolo contendere is equivalent to
a conviction by a jury for the purposes of that case-of driving
a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor
the driver shall be punished, and shall be prevented fom operating
motor vehicles upon the highways to the hazard of other citizens.
The General Asembly meticulously specified that the trial court
shall take up the defendant's license in court, and forward it to
' 44
the Department.
The court approved the imposition of the three-year revocation under G. S. § 20-19(d), 45 which, it will be noted, refers to a "second conviction" of drunken driving, rather than a conviction of a second offense
of drunken driving, the charge-to which the petitioner had pleaded nolo
contendere. Thus the imposition of the three-year revocation would
seem to be based on the cumulative effect of the 1949 conviction and
the 1952 plea of nolo contendere. If so, the question naturally arises as
to what the result would have been had the petitioner pleaded nolo
contendere in 1949 and been convicted in 1952. A rigid application
of the "same case" test would apparently lead to a result opposite to
that in the actual case. On the other hand, it seems doubtful at least
that legislative intent and purpose would be served by making the imposition of a longer revocation depend on whether it was the first or
second case in which the plea of nolo contendere was entered.
Mints v. Scheidt46 follows the Fox case and regards it as controlling.
The petitioner had pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of manslaughter
and the Department of Motor Vehicles had revoked his license, apN. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-19 (d) : "When a license is revoked for a second
conviction of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic drug,
the period of revocation shall be three years."
"Fox v. Scheidt, 241 N. C. 31, 36, 84 S. E. 2d 259, 263 (1954).
"See N.
noteC.43268,
.rupra.
48241
84 S.E. 2d 882 (1954).
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parently under the provisions of G. S. § 20-17(1).
However, the
notice of revocation sent to the petitioner did not specify the statutory
authority, and upon the petitioner's request the Department granted
him a hearing.48 In a letter to the petitioner's attorneys, the Department
of Motor Vehicles said the hearing was being granted pursuant to G. S.
§ 20-16(c). 49 This statement was apparently an inadvertence on the
part of the Department, but the petitioner built his case on it. He
claimed that the hearing "pursuant to the provisions of Section 20-16(c)
of the General Statutes" established the fact that the Department was
suspending his license under G. S. § 20-16 instead of revoking it under
G. S. § 20-17, and thus his case was governed by the Winesett rather
than the Fox decision. The court, however, said that the Department
had a duty to revoke the license under G. S. § 20-17. The hearing
granted was without authority of law, but neither the hearing nor the
letter estopped the Department from asserting that it had taken action
under the mandatory provisions of the state. 50
THE FUTURE OF THE PLEA

It may be argued with some persuasiveness that the plea of nolo
contendere serves no useful purpose today and should be abolished by
statute. The advantage of the plea is most frequently said to be that,
unlike a plea of guilty, it cannot be used against the defendant as an admission in a subsequent civil case.5 1 But for that matter neither may a
', "The Department shall forthwith revoke the license of any operator or
chauffuer upon receiving a record of such operator's or chauffeur's conviction for
manslaughter (or negligent homicide) resulting from the operation of a motor
vehicle." N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-17 (1) (1953).
"8There is no statutory provision for a hearing when a license is revoked.
,' "Upon suspending the license of any person as hereinbefore in this section
authorized, the Department . . . shall afford him an opportunity for a hearing. . . . Upon such hearing the Department shall either rescind its order of
suspension, or good cause appearing therfor, may extend the suspension of such
license. .. ." [Emphasis added.] N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16 (C) (1953).
"' The Court also held that the lower court lacked jurisdiction of the petitioner's
appeal and that the proceedings were void ab initio. The Court had previously
said that the right of appeal under N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-25 applies only when
the action of the Department is discretionary, and not when it is mandatory. In re
Wright, 228 N. C 584, 46 S. E. 2d 696 (1948).
"1Even a plea of guilty is no more than an admission in a subsequent civil case.
In State v. Burnett, 174 N. C. 796, 797, 93 S. E. 473, 474 (1917), the Court, citing
a Massachusetts case, said: "The only advantage in a plea of nolo contendere
gained by the defendant is that it gives him the advantge of not being estopped
to deny his guilt in civil action based upon the same facts. Upon a plea of guilty
entered of record, the defendant would be estopped to deny his guilt if sued in a
civil proceeding." The foregoing language was quoted in In re Stiers, 204 N. C. 48,
167 S. E. 382 (1933) ; State v. Thomas, 236 N. C. 196, 72 S. E. 2d 525 (1952) ;
and Winesett v. Scheidt, 239 N. C. 190, 79 S. E. 2d 501 (1954). Nevertheless,
there are no North Carolina cases holding that a plea of guilty acts as an estoppel
in a subsequent civil proceeding. Admissibility is one thing; conclusiveness, quite
another.

1956]

NOLO CONTENDERE IN NORTH CAROLINA

291

conviction upon a plea of not guilty be so used.5 2 Thus it would seem
that a defendant could accomplish the same purpose by pleading not
guilty. If he doesn't care to defend himself, he need not put in any evidence. However, such a practice would require the solicitor to put in
evidence and make a case against the defendant. Thus, the plea of nolo
contendere saves times and has some tendency to expedite judicial business.
Assuming that the plea of nolo contendere has a utility in a modern
criminal procedure and that it will be retained, further judicial ,clarification would be desirable. The effect of the plea in the case in which it
is entered has been made reasonably clear in North Carolina. For this
purpose, the plea has all the effects of a plea of guilty. 53 Only the
Oxendine case would seem opposed, a case which has been ignored since
it was decided.
There is still some doubt, however, as to the effect of the plea in
subsequent cases. This doubt exists in part because of a failure to draw
an adequate distinction between the use of the plea in a subsequent proceeding as an admission of guilt and the use of a conviction based on the
plea (or the plea as the equivalent of a conviction) in a subsequent proceeding, not as an admission of guilt, but for some other purpose. As
a matter of evidence, it is clear that the plea of nolo contendere is very
different from a plea of guilty. A plea of guilty might be said to be the
ultimate admission. It says, "I did it." The plea of nolo contendere
says only, "I do not care to discuss it." It is not an admission of anything. It would seem clear that the plea of nolo contendere should not
be admitted into evidence as an admission of guilt in any subsequent
case, civil or criminal.
As to a conviction based upon a plea of nolo contendere (or a plea
of nolo contendere as the equivalent of a conviction), there seems to be
no reason why it should be regarded differently from any other conviction. So regarded, it would not be admissible in an ordinary civil
case.54 However, the fact of conviction could be used under statutes
such as those providing that administrative penalties must or may be
" Swinson v. Nance, 219 N. C. 772, 15 S. E. 2d 284 (1941). On cross-examination, the defense attorney attempted to ask one of the plaintiffs in an action for
negligence growing out of an automobile accident if he had not been convicted of
reckless driving as a result of the accident. The plaintiff would have answered
in the affirmative. Exclusion of the evidence of conviction was held proper. While
the evidence was offered for the purposes of impeachment, it would seem that the
exclusion of the evidence, had it been offered on the issue of the plaintiff's negligence, should follow a fortiori. Cf. Warren v. Pilot Life Insurance Co., 215 N. C.
402, 2 S. E. 2d 17 (1939).
"' See page 281, supra.

"' Swinson v. Nance, 219 N. C. 772, 15 S. E. 2d 284 (1941). This is the view
of the great majority of courts. See 5 WIGmoRF, EVIDENca § 1671 (a) (3d ed.
1940).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

imposed upon conviction of certain offenses or series of offenses. This
line of reasoning would give to the defendant pleading nolo contendere
the traditional advantage of the plea, without frustrating the legislative
intent behind modern statutes providing for the imposition of administrative penalties in addition to criminal penalties or providing for
increased criminal penalties in cases of recidivism.55 Neibling v. Terry"°
contains an excellent discussion of this distinction.
The "same case" doctrine which has been developed in the Winsett,
Fox, and Mintz cases has so far produced the same result as that suggested above. The difficulty with this doctrine is that it seems to be
based on the mandatory nature of the administrative action.r 7 Thus, if
the imposition of the administrative penalty is required upon conviction,
the penalty is regarded as being action in the same case in which the plea
of nolo contendere is submitted. There is the strong suggestion that if
the administrative penalty was authorized, but not required, upon conviction, its imposition would not be regarded as part of the same case,
and that therefore it could not be imposed if the conviction was based
on a plea of nolo contendere. 58 Such a case might arise under G. S.
See Note, 12 N. C. L. REv. 369 (1934).
352 Mo. 396, 177 S. W. 2d 502 (1944). The court said, in part (at 398, 177
S. W. 2d at 503-504) : "We think that the confusion in the cases considering con-

victions on pleas of nolo contendere results from a judicial practice of clothing the
judgment of conviction with the characteristics of the plea or in speaking of the
plea and the conviction as one and the same. For example, there are cases which
hold that a judgment of conviction on a plea of nolo contendere may not be used
as an admission of guilt. But a judgment of conviction could never be used as
such an admission, regardless of the nature of the plea. It is the plea of guilty
which carries the evidentiary force as an admission, not the judgment of conviction
entered on the plea. Ordinarily a judgment of conviction is not proof of anything
in a civil proceeding except the mere fact of its rendition. By statute, in certain
instances, a judgment of conviction has been given force because of the fact of its
rendition. In such instances the judgment of conviction is made a basis for enforcing a statutory disability. Such statutes in no -wise authorize the use of a
conviction as an admission to be used to establish liability in a civil suit."
" The Fox and Mintz cases also look for support to N. C. GEm. STAT. § 2024 (a), requiring the court to pick up the license certificate upon a conviction for
which revocation is mandatory. However, this provision can scarcely be regarded
as controlling since it is only an administrative detail. Surrender of the license
certificate could be accomplished in a number of ways and is not to be confused
with revocation of the license.
"8It should be noted that a case involving this fact situation has not been
before the court. State v. Thomas, 236 N. C. 195, 72 S. E. 2d 525 (1952) and
Winesett v. Scheidt, 239 N. C. 190, 79 S. E. 2d 501 (1954), which may be thought
to involve the question, do not actually turn on the issue of whether a plea of nolo
contendere could be considered equivalent to a conviction for the purpose of discretionary action. In the Thomas case, the question was apparently conceived as
being whether the plea of nolo contendere was evidence of a violation of the law.
In the Winesett case, the question was whether the plea was evidence of the commission of an offense. Since a plea of nolo contendere is not an admission, it would
seem clear that both cases would have been decided as they were even without
reference to the "same case" theory. In re Stiers, 204 N. C. 48, 162 S. E. 2d 382
(1933) would of course heave been decided differently had the fact of conviction,
rather than admission or confession, been looked to; but it seems that it would
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§ 20-16(a)9, 59 which authorizes discretionary suspension of an operator's or chauffeur's license upon two convictions of speeding more
than 55 m.p.h. It seems doubtful that the legislative intent of the
Driver's License Act would be carried out by allowing the plea of nolo
contendere to be a refuge for the speeder, especially when it has already
0
been decided that it is not for the drunken driver.1
License suspensions and revocations are not civil cases in the traditional sense.0 ' The statutes authorizing them are in many cases designed to allow the imposition of administrative penalties in addition to
criminal penalties upon conviction of certain offenses. It is to be hoped
that North Carolina will not allow the operation of such statutes to
founder on a legal technicality, especially when such a result is not compelled by logic or authority.
also have been decided differently under the "same case" doctrine, since disbarment
was mandatory.
" "The Department shall have authority to suspend the license of any operator
or chauffeur . . . upon a showing by its records or other satisfactory evidence that
the licensee ... has, within a period of 12 months, been convicted of two or more
charges of speeding in excess of fifty-five (55) and not more than seventy-five (75)
miles per hour.. . ." N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16 (a) 9 (1953).
00 See discussion of the Fox case, page 280 supra.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that none of the North Carolina
cases dealing with the effect of the plea in subsequent proceedings are civil cases
in the sense of being controversies between private litigants.

